Introduction
Co-decision has de facto become a single-reading legislative procedure. Whereas in the 5 th (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) legislature, every other co-decision files was agreed in second-reading, in the 7 th EP term, almost 90% of all legislative files under co-decision were adopted as firstreading agreements (European Parliament, 2013 and 2014a ; Table 1 ). The critical element behind this phenomenon is the development of inter-institutional trilogue negotiations.
Trilogues have no reference in the EU treaties, but have developed in practice from the need of the two branches of the legislature, The Council of the European Union (Council of Ministers -CoM) and European Parliament (EP), to manage their interdependence (Shackleton and Raunio, 2003) . Trilogues include features that are problematic from a democratic perspective, in that they are secluded and involve a restricted number of participants selected according to unclear criteria, and produce intermediary outcomes that have to be sanctioned by formal decision-making processes Reh et al. 2013) . Consequently, there has been growing attention in public as well as scholarly debate to the implications of trilogues for political contestation and the ability of EU institutions to avoid capture by special interests.
We seek to address two gaps in the literature. First, despite the pivotal role of trilogues in the legislative process of the EU, we still have a limited understanding of what trilogues are in practice. Our knowledge of trilogues is either based on stylized definitions or on outdated empirical knowledge, and which shapes the contemporary public discourse on trilogues.
Second, in spite of an established focus on the normative dimension of trilogues, we know little 'This is an electronic pre-publication (including pre-proofs) version of an article submitted to the Journal of European Public Policy, and published as:
C Roederer-Rynning and J Greenwood 'The Culture of Trilogues' Journal of European Public Policy, which is available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080 /13501763.2014 4 about the social processes underpinning trilogues. The primary focus of the extant literature, reviewed in the next section, has been on instrumental rationality and attendant power games, efficiency gains, and redistributive implications. Recent research has pointed to some limitations of this agenda while highlighting the role of socialization processes .
This calls for further research through qualitative methods as a means of entry into the realms of norms.
Based on this diagnosis, we set out to analyze more systematically the set of practices constituting trilogues. We view trilogues as cultural constructs and are therefore interested in the social processes and understandings underpinning them as well as constituting the roles of EU legislators. We take our cue from cultural approaches considering instrumental rationality as a form of cultural action. On these premises, we map out various informal processes, which are often indiscriminately collapsed under the notion of trilogues and in doing so show how inter-institutional relations, and the actors involved in them, evolve as EU policy-makers embrace trilogues. Our objective is not just to provide an in-depth description of trilogues but also to highlight their role in constituting Parliament and Council as legislators.
Evolution of trilogues
Trilogues originally emerged as a means to facilitate the 'conciliation procedure' envisioned in the Maastricht Treaty, which obliged Council and Parliament to meet, subject to strict institutional requirements, in order to reach an agreement. Council soon learned the new realities of being a co-legislator, in that Parliament would veto any attempt by Council to reintroduce its common position, as it did in the Open Network Provision (ONP) Voice 'This is an electronic pre-publication (including pre-proofs) version of an article submitted to the Journal of European Public Policy, and published as: C Roederer-Rynning and J Greenwood 'The Culture of Trilogues' Journal of European Public Policy, which is available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080 /13501763.2014 5 Telephony Directive in 1994 (Shackleton, 2000) . Council understood that legislative efficiency under co-decision required early inter-institutional confidence-building measures. Since the early days of co-decision trilogues have become the way of making EU laws under co-decision after the Amsterdam Treaty made it possible for EU legislation to be passed at first reading (Art. 251 TEC now Art. 294 TFEU), thereby extending their use beyond that of the conciliation procedure (Table 1) .
Table 1 here
Barely had trilogues been "invented" before the first calls for reform were heard. Because the potential impact of executive discussions is most keenly felt in directly elected arenas, these discussions have been most prominent in the EP. In the first decade following the inception of trilogues, calls for reform materialized in non-binding guidelines which became increasingly detailed and specific over time (Héritier and Reh 2012 Thus, despite trilogues providing a means for EU decision-makers to proceed with greater convenience and expediency, it is noteworthy that they have been subject to increasing degrees of formalization, with regulation leading to a binding status over time.
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Three themes of research
Co-decision has been extensively scrutinized since its introduction in the Maastricht Treaty more than twenty years ago; but it is only in the last decade or so that observers, acknowledging the emergence and extension of trilogues to each and every phase of codecision legislation, have brought the informal politics of co-decision to the analytic centre.
Analyses of trilogues emerged at the turn of the millennium from the concern of observers to produce "a more realistic picture of co-decision" (Jacqué 2009, 183) . They brought informal practices to the analytic center of co-decision research (Shackleton 2000) and conceptualized trilogues as a "new mechanism" devised by the two branches of the legislature to manage their interdependence (Shackleton and Raunio, 2003) . These early accounts have structured the subsequent debate around three distinct though interrelated themes of research: the institutional variety of trilogues; their power-distributive implications; and finally their normative implications. The first of these showed that trilogues are institutionally different as a function of their location in co-decision: they are most formal in the conciliation phase, where "the context of negotiations is very clearly defined" and "Council is obliged to respond to (EP) amendments" (Shackleton and Raunio 2003, 177-8) with invaluable intelligence. Importantly, these "major changes" in Council were "not … replicated in the Parliament" (Shackleton and Raunio 2003, 175) . Quite the contrary, a new "legislative culture" developed in Parliament that valued pragmatism in interactions with
Council and a sense of responsibility in the formulation of policy preferences. "Being more closely associated to the legislative process, the EP became more responsible and attentive to the effects of legislation and progressively abandoned its tribunicienne attitude to develop more realistic positions" (Jacqué 2009, 9) . Finally, these early analyses highlighted the trade-off between efficiency and accountability and, crucially, showed how Parliament and Council tried to solve this dilemma differently. Paradoxically, Council, with arguably greater attachments to diplomatic habits than to accountability, was more adept than Parliament at securing internal democracy. There were indications-but little concrete evidence-that Council had developed elaborate mechanisms of internal coordination, which enabled the Presidency to better aggregate the positions of the national delegations. By contrast, Parliament presented a rather sorry picture, as the increasing role of core trilogue players in making informal deals undercut the ability of EP committees to aggregate internal preferences (Shackleton and Raunio 2003) .
Of these three themes, the power implications of trilogues have received most systematic attention in recent analyses of trilogues; the normative implications are starting to be addressed more thoroughly; and surprisingly, we lack systematic empirical analyses of trilogues. The quest to pin down the distributional impact of co-decision has generated several institutional analyses exploring inter-institutional power shifts (Häge and Kaeding 2007; Costa, Dehousse, and Trakalova 2011; Costello and Thomson 2013; Burns 2013) , as well as intra-institutional power 'This is an electronic pre-publication (including pre-proofs) version of an article submitted to shifts (Yordanova 2009; Rasmussen 2011; Rasmussen and Reh 2013; Häge and Naurin 2013) .
Analyses of discrete EU policy-making dossiers characterized by longstanding EP activism have tended to substantiate the thesis of a convergence of policy preferences between the two branches of the legislature, a phenomenon generally explained by the new strategic and cultural context of informal co-decision (Burns and Carter 2010; Ripoll Servent 2011; Rasmussen 2012) .
In spite of this intense scholarly interest, however, key questions remain unsettled: the Looking at an area long dominated by transgovernmental executive power (the Basel process and its institutionalization in the EU), Greenwood and Roederer-Rynning (2014, 14) have shown that Parliament "successfully introduced significant identifiable components into the final legislative package" showing its ability to "learn to act within its institutional mandate to make an impact upon the course of EU financial regulatory reform." Finally, talk of a new legislative culture common to Parliament and Council should not obscure the fact that, as before, Parliament and Council are far from being "fully in agreement about how to handle codecision" and consequently we should be careful not "to overlook important differences of opinion about how such an expansion should take place" (Shackleton and Raunio 2003, 176) .
Reform efforts in Parliament (European Parliament 2008 , 2011 clearly show that the politics of informal co-decision dialectically intertwines a "pacification" of Parliament (Costa et al. 2011 ) and efforts by the legislators themselves to redress power shifts and lack of voice 'This is an electronic pre-publication (including pre-proofs) version of an article submitted to opportunities (Héritier and Reh 2012) . This, in turn, underpins a process of institutional evolution, which redefines the territory of informal politics in co-decision as well as its broader implications for effective and democratic governance in the EU.
The normative dimension of trilogues has become the most pressing item on the academic and political agenda. Indeed, discussions on trilogues have spilled over into the public debate, where normative concerns have featured prominently. A decade of institutional reform by EU institutions to make the decision-making process more transparent and visible have not succeeded in preventing broad public criticism as to the legitimacy of trilogues.
Respected media regularly portray EU law-making as "infernal, undemocratic" and "secret," /www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13501763.2014.992934 11 systematically the set of practices constituting trilogues and their relation, both theoretical and empirical, to formal rules.
The Culture of Trilogues
The instrumentalist perspective of the extant literature seems intuitively appealing: power is incontestably at stake in trilogues and it is easy to pin down specific individuals or groups of individuals and their interests; furthermore, trilogues have grown to encompass all phases of co-decision politics in spite of concerns about democratic implications. Most of the organizational and institutional changes brought about by trilogues seemed to relate to issues of efficiency in the Council, while concerns for broad democratic principles did not seem to have much impact on the actual organization and institutionalization of trilogues. In response to these arguments, however, we point out that trilogues are part and parcel of a broader reality, co-decision politics, the main purpose of which is to impart legitimacy to EU decision-making processes (Rittberger 2005; Rittberger and Schimmelfennig 2006) ; and furthermore, that rationalist explanations have shown their limits, and that scholars now turn to norms and socialization in order to shed additional light on trilogues (Neuhold 2007; Rasmussen, 2012; Reh et al. 2013; Ripoll Servent, 2014) .
Building on these preliminary insights, we view trilogues as cultural constructs, conforming to local practices and understandings rather than abstract efficiency rules. Our point is not that norms and socialization matter-we assume they do. Nor is it to deny the role of efficiency-we acknowledge efficiency as one of the main forces shaping trilogues. Rather, 'This is an electronic pre-publication (including pre-proofs) version of an article submitted to we see instrumental action as cultural action (Dobbin 1994) , in line with a rich though eclectic intellectual tradition urging us to explore the social origins of instrumental rationality (Weber 1930; March and Olsen 1989; DiMaggio and Powell 1991) . Drawing on this tradition, we define culture as shared conceptions of social reality. We are here referring more specifically to 'organizational culture', which has been defined as 'how things are done, and how they are meant to be done in the organization' (Kreps quoted in Lewis 2010, 656) . Culture involves prescriptions of social role, or norms; norms are manifested in standard operating procedures--the organizational expression of norms; and eventually, they generate distinctive practices when they are internalized and adequately policed. We use the term institutionalization specifically to refer to the process whereby formal organization and technical procedure becomes infused with value (Selznick 1949) . Through institutionalization, organizations (actors) are turned into institutions (cultural categories). Institutionalization makes interactions (and conflicts) more predictable and ritualistic, while at the same time constituting actors, with their interests and identities (Dobbin 1994, 134) . Finally, culture is not static or deterministic. Shared conceptions of social reality are negotiated in cultural encounters; and in turn they are inflected in individual strategies, combining sometimes even quite deliberately aspects of the cultural "tool-kit" into individual strategies (Swidler 1986 ). Even so, "this kind of deliberate use of culture is highly institutionalized" (Dobbin, 1994, 132) .
Thus, when we speak of trilogues as an institution, we mean that trilogues have moved away from being simple technical devices for managing the interdependence of the colegislators to cultural constructs crystallizing different conceptions of institutional design. We 'This is an electronic pre-publication (including pre-proofs) version of an article submitted to (Shackleton and Raunio 2003, 176) . In these encounters, not only rival appropriate conceptions of institutional design affront each other; organizations (actors) are also turned into institutions (cultural categories).
Pursuing an essentially phenomenological approach (Dobbin 1994, 128) , we take stock of the knowledge that actors involved in trilogues have acquired and that they 'use to interpret experience and generate social behaviour' (Spradley 1979) . Our interpretation of trilogues is based on extensive field research. 34 interviews were conducted in 2014, in which the trilogue process formed the main focus of discussion. Given our focus on organizationally-embedded perceptions and roles, we conducted interviews in all three EU institutions: Commission, Council, and Parliament. Our aim was to reconstruct an in-depth narrative of trilogues free from prior theoretical hypotheses other than the basic epistemological assumptions stated above, and based on the perceptions of trilogue participants. We start by mapping out the various informal processes often lumped together under the notion of trilogues; we then explore how trilogues constitute Parliament and Council as legislators by pinpointing the development of distinctive norms and practices in both institutions.
Ritualized conflict
Trilogues can be understood as an onion-like construct encompassing three main layers of practices. At the core of this structure (layer I) are the full trilogues, also called political 'This is an electronic pre-publication (including pre-proofs) version of an article submitted to which the distinction between 'technical' and 'political' is operated. In the EP, internal meetings with technical staff and group assistants prepare the ground, specifying where to draw the limit, ahead of technical trilogues (interview 1). There is also a consensual norm that technical trilogues should not involve staff at a high level of hierarchy (more on this below).
In both layers I and II, the legislators negotiate on the basis of specific mandates recorded in a so-called 'four-column table' document. Table 3 lists, provision by provision, the Commission proposal (column 1), the EP amendments to the Commission proposals (column 2), the Council's text (column 3), and the results from the negotiations (column 4) ( Table 2) .
Table 2 here
The four-column documents are publicly available once the legislative text is adopted, either through the webpages of some EP Committees, at the initiative of some parliamentarians, or through EU Access to Documents measures. However, this provision appears to be limited by practical and political difficulties. Four-column documents evolve continuously, making it very difficult to trace individual versions of them. Furthermore, access requires the consent of all three institutions, which is often not likely to be granted owing to prevailing norms of confidentiality in the Council (interview 3, European Commission, 10.9.
2014).
Layer III meetings, by contrast, typically take place before trilogues have even begun.
This layer consists of bilateral meetings between the Presidency and EP representatives. It is even less well known even though it is important and also to an increasing extent ritualized.
The institution of the 'rotating Presidency' is an important driver of informal contacts. /www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13501763.2014.992934 19 in contacting the shadow rapporteurs before an esprit de corps has fully developed in the EP team.
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How trilogues constitute Parliament and Council as legislators
Trilogues have challenged the main actors participating in EU decision-making to specify how binding decisions should be reached. Exploring the norms, standard operating procedures, and the resources harnessed to fulfill institutionally-defined roles, we show how the embrace of trilogues has shaped Parliament and Council as legislators.
European Parliament-developing habits of a "normal" parliament
A distinct body of norms, standard operating procedures, and practices related to Seen from the Council, the ECON approach appears as a set of rigid and sometimes absurd rules, which have strained the working relations between the two co-legislators. Seen from ECON, it has been the key to delivering outcomes that were close to the EP's policy preferences while incorporating a plurality of views. From the vantage point of our research, the institutionalization of ECON norms in Parliament illustrates the insights that can be gained from viewing instrumental rationality as cultural action, i.e., conforming to local cultural prescriptions-here, common standards of transparency and accountability applying to "normal" legislative chambers-rather than general rules of efficiency. Whilst formal rules of the game may place Parliament at a disadvantage viz. the Council (the higher threshold for a majority in second reading, etc), the routines established by the Conference of Committee Chairs (CCC) or the EP secretariat on a cross-committee, the EP's dominance of logistical arrangements, the advantage conferred by numbers in full political trilogies, and its fleetness of foot relative to the Council, have enabled Parliament to acquire leverage over Council.
Council malaise
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Council has traditionally worked on the basis of a substantive criterion, conditioning the opening of trilogue negotiations to the harnessing of a supportive coalition. A Presidency opens trilogue negotiations when it feels it has a substantive majority in Council. If a majority materializes at the level of the working parties, it will likely be confirmed at COREPER level, which is the reason why in COREPER I (with the longest experience with trilogues) the longstanding practice has been for working parties to prepare a mandate and then go straight In the last few years, tensions have developed between the need for increased confidentiality and centralization on the one hand, and the need for accountability and monitoring on the other hand. Mandates are now elaborated in bilateral correspondence between the Presidency and the Secretariat on the one hand, and the national delegations (and the Commission) on the other hand. As was the case before, the Presidency and the Secretariat send draft proposals to the national delegations and the Commission; however now, feedback 'This is an electronic pre-publication (including pre-proofs) version of an article submitted to the Journal of European Public Policy, and published as: C Roederer-Rynning and J Greenwood 'The Culture of Trilogues' Journal of European Public Policy, which is available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080 /13501763.2014 24 from the national delegation takes place bilaterally and confidentially. At the same time,
COREPER is now more systematically involved in delivering mandates. This happened first in the most sensitive COREPER II areas, but this practice has now spilled over to COREPER I owing to growing sensitivity to the need to refresh mandates in even uncontroversial files Changes in Council's approach finally reflect the impact of enlargement. Enlargement has brought with it many small states with limited technical resources and capacity to undertake the political complexities required in compositing the positions of twenty eight member states 'This is an electronic pre-publication (including pre-proofs) version of an article submitted to the Journal of European Public Policy, and published as: C Roederer-Rynning and J Greenwood 'The Culture of Trilogues' Journal of European Public Policy, which is available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080 /13501763.2014 .992934 (interview 13, CoM, 8.9.2014 . Arrangements for Presidency co-ordination are in place through 'Troika' arrangements linking groups of three Presidencies together, but a disjuncture is created by the absence of 'gliding' arrangements to subsequent Presidencies. The General Secretariat of the Council is able to smooth out the bumps from one Presidency to another but it is not If Council were to become the Senate of the EU, it would have to embrace norms of transparency and public accountability, as Parliament is doing. In the last few years, changes have indeed taken place, as we have seen, but they do not add up to a parliamentarization of Council. While the more systematic involvement of COREPER has led to a certain degree of proceduralization, Council continues to operate on the basis of norms of confidentiality that are difficult to reconcile with those of a legislative chamber (Wessels 1991) .
Conclusion
In the old days of trilogues, Commission proposals disappeared in informal politics, only 'This is an electronic pre-publication (including pre-proofs) version of an article submitted to (Farrell and Héritier, 2004) ; trilogues were but a theatre of formalized meetings and observers (Bunyan, 2007) . This drama seemed to involve a winner, Council, drawing on its superior organizational adaptation, clear information asymmetries and the expertise of 20-some national administrations, playing on the strategic advantages of its centralized representation, and instrumentalizing norms of political realism and legislative responsibility-to bring Parliament to its favored position. Parliament, on the other hand, was cast as the loser as trilogues hollowed it out, leaving its committees with little more than a nominal role in the legislative process.
By contrast, we find that trilogues today are an elaborate and ritualized process of aggregation and negotiation of preferences involving a broad range actors meeting both in inter-institutional fora as well as intra-institutional fora. They revolve around specific mandates, are underpinned by a distinctly recognizable body of norms, standard operating procedures, and practices in Council and Parliament, and are regulated by an increasing web of oversight mechanisms linking formal and informal institutions. In the end, the world of trilogues is not black-and-white and static. These are important correctives to earlier research highlighting one-sidedly the evergrowing hold of diplomatic norms of negotiation in Parliament. They open up new areas of research on trilogues. We identify three priorities for future research. First, we need to assess more systematically the scope and depth of variation within Council and across EP committees.
'Culture is not uniform' as Lewis (2010, 655) reminds us, and the EP's historical approach to trilogues has certainly been contextually defined, as different committees developed their own compass in inter-institutional negotiations. Therefore we should expect to find different cultural textures within the EP and probably also Council, reflecting different social and political processes. Future research must identify and trace the mechanisms underpinning norm creation and norm diffusion in both Council and EP. Second, we need to know more 'This is an electronic pre-publication (including pre-proofs) version of an article submitted to the Journal of European Public Policy, and published as: C Roederer-Rynning and J Greenwood 'The Culture of Trilogues' Journal of European Public Policy, which is available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080 /13501763.2014 28 about how lobby groups and civil society at large respond to their exclusion from the trilogue process. Previous findings suggested that the EP's embrace of trilogues ushered in a new era of pragmatism at the cost of a loss of political contestation or of the capture of informal politics by special interests. Our present findings suggest that the linkages between trilogues and interest groups need more systematic examination as: information asymmetries are more complex than generally alleged; Parliament has learnt to navigate the world of informal politics, not least through a range of logistical advantages it holds over Council in the standard operating procedures of trilogues; and furthermore has seen in norms of public accountability a means to acquire leverage over Council. Third, there is a need to account for the strikingly growing legislative activism of the European Council in the last few years as this phenomenon escapes the boundaries of co-decision and creates a new informal venue of legislative politics disconnected from trilogues and associated oversight institutions.
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